President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s state visit to Seoul has placed Türkiye’s long-delayed second nuclear power plant back at the center of international investment discussions. Ankara considers South Korea a strong potential partner for the proposed Sinop facility, but Erdoğan has made clear that no supplier has been selected. Financing terms, the eventual cost of electricity and the project’s contribution to the Turkish economy will determine whether Korea Electric Power Corporation, or KEPCO, advances from preliminary studies to one of Türkiye’s largest foreign investment projects.
Sinop Moves Back Onto the Bilateral Agenda
Erdoğan arrived in South Korea on November 2 for his first state visit to the country since 2018. He is scheduled to meet President Lee Jae Myung during the three-day visit, with nuclear energy, defense, trade, logistics and advanced technology among the principal subjects.
In a written interview with Yonhap News Agency before the visit, Erdoğan described South Korea as a partner with “great potential” for Sinop. He said Türkiye had conducted extensive preliminary feasibility work with state-controlled KEPCO and was continuing to evaluate the project’s technical and economic conditions.
Reuters, citing the Yonhap interview, reported that Ankara would assess three central issues before choosing a partner: access to finance, the cost of the electricity produced and the wider benefits for the Turkish economy. That formulation is significant because it frames Sinop not simply as an engineering procurement exercise, but as a long-term industrial and financial partnership.
The latest negotiations build on a memorandum of understanding signed by KEPCO and Türkiye Nuclear Energy Company, known as TÜNAŞ, during Lee’s visit to Ankara in November 2025. Türkiye’s Energy and Natural Resources Ministry said the agreement covered project development, technology and knowledge sharing, site assessment, financing and workforce development. It provided a framework for negotiations, rather than a construction contract.
South Korea’s presidential office said the November 3 summit would review progress since Lee’s Ankara visit and discuss cooperation in nuclear power, trade, investment, defense, biotechnology and science. As of Erdoğan’s arrival, neither government had announced a binding Sinop agreement, a reactor configuration, an ownership structure or a construction timetable.
Why Türkiye Wants Another Large Nuclear Plant
Türkiye’s nuclear program is being driven by electricity demand, energy-import exposure and its 2053 net-zero objective.
The Energy and Natural Resources Ministry recorded electricity consumption of 364.8 terawatt-hours in 2025, an increase of 3.2 percent from the previous year. Under the Türkiye National Energy Plan, consumption is projected to reach 455.3 terawatt-hours in 2030 and 510.5 terawatt-hours in 2035. The International Energy Agency’s 2026 review noted that Turkish electricity demand grew by almost 5 percent annually between 2005 and 2024, the fastest rate among IEA members.
Renewables will supply much of the additional capacity, but Ankara sees nuclear generation as a source of continuous, low-carbon power that can complement variable wind and solar output. Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said in November 2025 that Türkiye was targeting 12 large reactors and 5,000 megawatts of small modular reactors by 2050. Together, these facilities are intended to provide between 10 and 15 percent of national electricity generation. The wider official objective is 20,000 megawatts of nuclear capacity by mid-century.
Energy security is equally important. The World Bank has estimated that Türkiye relies on imports for around 70 percent of its energy requirements, leaving the economy exposed to commodity prices, exchange-rate volatility and geopolitical disruptions. Associated Press reported in September 2026 that Türkiye imported $42.37 billion of goods from Russia in the previous year, of which $29.8 billion was energy.
Nuclear power does not eliminate foreign dependence. Reactors require imported technology, fuel-cycle services and specialist maintenance. It can, however, reduce exposure to continually purchased gas and coal, while diversifying the countries and contractual structures on which the power system relies.
The planned Sinop station would also diversify Türkiye’s nuclear partnerships. Rosatom is building and will own and operate the four-unit, 4,800-megawatt Akkuyu plant under a 2010 intergovernmental agreement with Russia. The first Akkuyu unit is undergoing commissioning, with the Energy Ministry targeting initial electricity production by the end of 2026. When all four units are operating, the ministry expects the plant to produce approximately 35 terawatt-hours annually, equivalent to about 10 percent of Türkiye’s 2024 electricity consumption.
KEPCO Brings a Proven Export Model, With Conditions
KEPCO’s main advantage is its record at the Barakah nuclear plant in the United Arab Emirates. The Korean-led consortium delivered four APR1400 pressurized-water reactors with total capacity of 5,600 megawatts. According to KEPCO and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, the units entered commercial operation successively in 2021, 2022, 2023 and September 2024.
That experience gives the Korean group a rare reference project involving the construction, licensing and operation of a complete nuclear fleet in a country previously without commercial nuclear generation. KEPCO says the APR1400 received European Utility Requirements certification in 2017 and design certification from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2019.
Barakah also illustrates the financial scale involved. A November 2025 KEPCO securities filing put its expected total project cost at approximately $29.5 billion. KEPCO holds an 18 percent interest in the operating project company and had contributed about $1.22 billion by March 2025. A comparable Sinop development would therefore require sovereign-level financial coordination, export-credit participation and a bankable long-term revenue arrangement.
Intellectual property was previously another source of uncertainty for Korean nuclear exports. In January 2025, KEPCO, KHNP and US-based Westinghouse reached a global settlement resolving their outstanding dispute. The US Department of Energy said the agreement could support extensive future cooperation in overseas nuclear projects. The commercial terms remain confidential, so Turkish negotiators will still need to establish which licenses, components, approvals and supply obligations would apply to any APR1400 deployment at Sinop.
The Korean proposal is not the only option. The World Nuclear Association reported that TÜNAŞ signed a separate memorandum with Canada’s Candu Energy, part of AtkinsRéalis, in March 2026 to evaluate CANDU technology. Ankara has also held discussions with Russia, China and US-linked suppliers about additional plants or reactor cooperation. Maintaining several negotiating channels gives Türkiye leverage over financing, localization and electricity prices.
Financing Has Already Defeated Sinop Once
Sinop has a long history of negotiations that failed to become construction projects. KEPCO and Türkiye’s state electricity company explored a four-reactor development in 2010, but the talks foundered over the form of government-backed electricity sales guarantees, according to the World Nuclear Association.
Türkiye then signed an agreement in 2013 with a Japanese-led consortium involving Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and France’s then-Areva. The plan ultimately became commercially unworkable as projected costs rose and the schedule slipped. Then-Energy Minister Fatih Dönmez said in January 2020 that the proposed budget and timetable no longer met Türkiye’s expectations.
That history explains Erdoğan’s present emphasis on financing and power costs. Nuclear projects have long construction periods and face inflation, exchange-rate, interest-rate and delay risks before generating revenue. The allocation of those risks among Türkiye, KEPCO, lenders, contractors and electricity consumers will matter as much as the reactor design.
Akkuyu provides one possible benchmark, although Ankara may seek a different model for Sinop. Under the Russian agreement, Türkiye’s state electricity purchaser committed to buy specified shares of output from the four units for 15 years at a weighted average price of 12.35 US cents per kilowatt-hour, excluding value-added tax. Rosatom assumed the leading investment and ownership role through a build-own-operate structure.
A Korean arrangement might instead combine Turkish and Korean equity, project finance, export-credit guarantees and a power-purchase mechanism. Each structure creates different implications for public liabilities, foreign-exchange exposure, asset control, taxation and long-term operating responsibility. These issues will need to be resolved before headline investment figures are treated as committed FDI.
Localization, Licensing and the Wider Investment Opportunity
Sinop is more advanced in site preparation than the absence of a technology decision might suggest. The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Türkiye’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority granted site approval in April 2024 following TÜNAŞ’s application in May 2023. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency also confirms that the site has regulatory approval, while the technology provider remains undecided.
Site approval is only one part of the process. A developer would still face reactor-specific licensing, environmental requirements, construction permits, grid-connection planning, nuclear security standards, emergency preparedness, radioactive-waste arrangements and liability rules. Türkiye’s Nuclear Regulation Law No. 7381, adopted in March 2022, defines the authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority and establishes responsibilities for nuclear damage, decommissioning and waste management.
For international suppliers, localization will be a central commercial issue. The Energy Ministry reported that local content at Akkuyu had reached 55.3 percent by the first quarter of 2025 across equipment, materials and services. Ankara is likely to seek comparable or stronger commitments at Sinop, particularly in civil construction, conventional-island equipment, engineering services, logistics and workforce training.
Such requirements could create opportunities for Korean manufacturers and other foreign suppliers to establish Turkish subsidiaries, joint ventures or supplier-development programs. Türkiye’s free-trade agreement with South Korea has been in force since 2013, while agreements covering services and investment entered into force in 2018. South Korea’s Ministry of Trade said bilateral commerce reached a record $10.7 billion in 2025 and that cumulative Korean investment in Türkiye stood at $4.6 billion across 1,176 projects, with manufacturing representing 47 percent.
The relationship remains unbalanced. Figures cited by Erdoğan showed Turkish exports to South Korea of about $1.14 billion in 2025, against imports of $10.26 billion. Ankara is therefore likely to evaluate Sinop partly by whether it brings production, engineering capability and export potential into Türkiye, rather than simply adding another large import contract.
What This Means for Foreign Investors
Erdoğan’s Seoul visit raises the probability of a structured Korean bid for Sinop, but it does not yet establish a final investment decision. The decisive phase will concern risk allocation: who provides capital, who absorbs construction overruns, what electricity revenue is guaranteed, how currency exposure is managed and how much technology and procurement activity remains in Türkiye.
Companies seeking roles in the project should begin with market-entry analysis that distinguishes reactor-island opportunities from construction, logistics, engineering, digital systems, training and conventional equipment. Incorporation and corporate structuring will matter for joint ventures, tender eligibility, tax treatment and liability separation. Investment-incentive analysis will be needed to determine which manufacturing, research, employment and regional-support measures can apply without conflicting with the project’s procurement framework.
Legal and tax compliance will extend beyond ordinary corporate rules to nuclear licensing, environmental approvals, customs, controlled technology, export restrictions, labor standards and long-duration service contracts. Import-export facilitation will be especially important for specialized components whose certification and customs treatment must align with construction schedules.
Government relations and regulatory liaison will be necessary because the project will involve the Energy Ministry, TÜNAŞ, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, grid institutions, local administrations and potentially several sovereign financing bodies. Expo and trade-fair representation can help suppliers enter the Korean and Turkish procurement networks before formal contracting begins, while project management will be essential for coordinating permitting, localization, workforce development and delivery across a program likely to span more than a decade.
For an FDI adviser such as fdiconsultancy.com, the practical role is to connect those workstreams into an executable entry plan. Sinop may ultimately become a nuclear agreement between states, but much of its investment value will be created by the companies able to navigate Türkiye’s corporate, regulatory and industrial landscape once the political framework is converted into contracts.