Investment

Türkiye and China Pursue Green Investment and Local Production Ties

November 10, 2026

Türkiye and China used a high-level business forum in Istanbul on November 9 to call for a shift from import-led commerce toward green technology, local production and two-way investment. The ambition is economically significant: China is Türkiye’s largest source of imports, but Turkish officials now want Chinese capital in renewable energy, batteries, electric vehicles and advanced manufacturing to narrow a bilateral trade deficit that exceeded $46 billion in 2025. For investors, however, the opportunity sits at the intersection of industrial incentives, carbon regulation, customs rules and unresolved questions about how Chinese-backed production in Türkiye would be treated in European markets.

Istanbul Forum Targets an Investment-Based Relationship

The Türkiye-China Green Development Business Forum brought together Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz, Chinese Vice President Han Zheng, Industry and Technology Minister Mehmet Fatih Kacır, Trade Minister Ömer Bolat and representatives of major business organizations. The event, organized by Türkiye’s Foreign Economic Relations Board, or DEİK, and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, coincided with the 55th anniversary of diplomatic relations and the opening of COP31 in Antalya.

The forum covered renewable energy, environmental technologies, recycling, smart manufacturing, electric vehicles, petrochemicals, logistics, finance and tourism. Its breadth reflected Ankara’s effort to reposition the bilateral relationship. Rather than remaining primarily a market for Chinese equipment and consumer goods, Türkiye wants to become a production, research and export platform for Chinese companies serving Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa.

“We welcome Chinese companies increasing their investments in Türkiye,” Yılmaz said, according to Türkiye Today’s report on the forum. He described the trade imbalance as a structural issue requiring joint action, rather than a political disagreement.

Bolat similarly argued that the relationship should move beyond conventional buying and selling. In a statement published by the Turkish Ministry of Trade, he identified renewable energy, storage, electric mobility, energy efficiency, the circular economy and low-carbon industrial technologies as priority areas. He also invited Chinese businesses to establish regional operations at the Istanbul Financial Center and use Türkiye’s new investment programs.

Han, meanwhile, presented Türkiye as an important West Asian economic partner and a significant participant in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The political message was one of complementarity: Chinese technology and financing could be combined with Türkiye’s industrial base, geographic position and customs relationship with the European Union.

A $53 Billion Trade Relationship Remains Deeply Uneven

The immediate challenge is the scale and composition of bilateral trade. Data published by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs show that Türkiye exported approximately $3.3 billion of goods to China in 2025 while importing $49.6 billion, producing total trade of $52.9 billion and a deficit of $46.3 billion.

Türkiye’s exports are concentrated in marble, travertine, borates and metal ores such as chromium, copper, lead, iron and zinc. Imports from China include mobile phones, computers, communications equipment, compressors and converters. The imbalance is therefore not only quantitative. It also reflects an exchange of Turkish raw materials for higher-value manufactured and technological products.

There was some improvement in 2026. Anadolu Agency reported that Turkish exports to China reached $3.394 billion in the first nine months, already exceeding each of the previous four full-year totals. Bilateral trade reached $44.7 billion over the same period. Even so, higher exports from a low base will not substantially rebalance the relationship without greater Chinese investment in Turkish production or a broader market opening for Turkish food, industrial and service exports.

Recent regulatory agreements offer a limited route toward diversification. In October 2025, Türkiye’s agriculture minister and China’s General Administration of Customs signed three protocols covering Turkish seafood and almond exports. Tourism is expanding more rapidly. Chinese arrivals reached a record 435,309 in the first nine months of 2026, according to Anadolu Agency, after Türkiye introduced visa-free entry for Chinese citizens in January.

For Turkish exporters, converting such openings into sales requires more than diplomatic agreements. Products must satisfy Chinese registration, inspection, labeling and customs requirements. Import-export facilitation, regulatory liaison and trade-fair representation therefore become practical components of market access, particularly for smaller producers without permanent teams in China.

Green Technology Is the Centerpiece of Ankara’s Offer

Türkiye is pitching its green transition as both an investment requirement and an industrial development strategy. Kacır told the forum that the government plans to provide $30 billion in support by 2030 for batteries, electric vehicles, solar cells, wind turbines, semiconductors, artificial intelligence and industrial robotics.

The HIT-30 High Technology Investment Program is central to this effort. It is intended to support large projects capable of bringing technology, export capacity and local supply-chain development into Türkiye. A broader incentive overhaul introduced by Presidential Decree No. 9903 in May 2025 provides eligible projects with instruments that may include customs and value-added tax exemptions for machinery, financing support, social security contribution relief, corporate tax reductions and land allocation, according to UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Monitor.

Foreign-owned companies incorporated in Türkiye can generally access investment incentives on the same basis as domestically owned companies. Eligibility, however, is project-specific. Technology level, location, minimum investment, production capacity, local value creation and the precise machinery list can affect the available support.

Energy targets strengthen the demand case. Kacır said Türkiye aims to raise combined wind and solar capacity from 43 gigawatts to 175 gigawatts by 2040, establish 140 gigawatt-hours of battery storage and install 10 gigawatts of nuclear capacity. Bolat cited an interim objective of reaching 120 gigawatts of wind and solar by 2035.

These plans create potential demand for generation equipment, grid technologies, storage systems, power electronics, recycling and energy-efficiency services. Yet projects must navigate generation and storage licensing, grid-connection capacity, environmental approvals, land rights, procurement conditions and foreign-exchange exposure. Market-entry analysis must therefore distinguish between a promising national target and a bankable project with a secured site, connection rights and credible buyers.

Automotive Experience Shows the Execution Risk

The automotive sector illustrates both the logic of Chinese investment and the gap that can emerge between announced projects and delivered capacity.

BYD signed an agreement in July 2024 for a $1 billion manufacturing and research facility in Manisa. The project was expected to produce 150,000 electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles annually and create up to 5,000 jobs. In March 2025, Turkish officials also announced a planned plant in Samsun involving Chery’s partners, with investment of up to $1 billion and annual capacity of 200,000 vehicles.

By June 2026, however, BYD Executive Vice President Stella Li told Reuters that construction in Manisa had not started and that the project was on hold while the company prioritized its Hungarian factory. The company had not established a new timetable. This does not necessarily mean the Turkish project has been abandoned, but it demonstrates why incentive agreements, implementation schedules, land delivery, supplier readiness and performance obligations matter as much as headline investment values.

Trade policy adds another complication. In July 2026, a World Trade Organization panel ruled on a Chinese complaint concerning Türkiye’s additional vehicle duties and import-permit requirements. The WTO’s case summary said certain additional duties exceeded Türkiye’s tariff commitments and that after-sales requirements imposed through the import-permit system treated affected foreign vehicles less favorably than comparable Turkish products.

At the same time, producing in Türkiye does not automatically guarantee that a Chinese-owned manufacturer will avoid European trade defenses. Türkiye participates in a customs union with the EU, but European authorities can still examine origin, subsidies, local value added and possible circumvention. Prospective manufacturers need product-level customs analysis before assuming that Turkish assembly provides unrestricted access to the EU market.

These factors elevate the importance of legal and tax compliance, government relations and project management. An investor must align its corporate structure, incentive certificate, import treatment, production commitments and export strategy, then monitor regulatory changes across both Türkiye and the intended destination markets.

Logistics and Climate Rules Strengthen the Strategic Case

Türkiye also wants to connect its Middle Corridor with China’s Belt and Road network. The two governments signed a memorandum on alignment in 2015, and the first joint working-group meeting was held in Beijing in November 2024. Turkish officials point to the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, the Marmaray tunnel, a planned railway crossing over Istanbul’s Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge and the Development Road through Iraq as components of a wider Asia-Europe logistics system.

DEİK President Nail Olpak said the commercial priority should include filling west-to-east return containers, a reference to the imbalance between incoming Chinese cargo and more limited Turkish exports. That requires coordinated rail capacity, terminal handling, customs procedures and commercially viable backhaul cargo, not merely new infrastructure.

Climate regulation provides another reason for manufacturing to move closer to its final markets. Türkiye adopted its first framework Climate Law in July 2025, creating the legal foundation for an emissions trading system and more formal measurement, reporting and verification obligations. The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism entered its financial phase in 2026, initially affecting carbon-intensive products including iron, steel, aluminum, cement, fertilizers, electricity and hydrogen.

Chinese-backed production in Türkiye that supplies European customers must consequently account for electricity sourcing, embedded emissions and auditable supplier data. Clean power procurement and traceable low-carbon inputs may become commercial necessities rather than optional environmental commitments. Legal and tax compliance now extends into carbon accounting, while project design must incorporate grid emissions, energy contracts and future carbon costs.

What This Means for Foreign Investors

The Istanbul forum signals strong political support for Chinese and other international investment in Türkiye’s green economy, but the investable opportunity lies in project detail. Investors should first conduct sector-specific market-entry work, testing domestic demand, export-market treatment, infrastructure capacity and realistic local sourcing rather than relying on national growth targets alone.

The next step is corporate and financial structuring. Company incorporation should be coordinated with the intended incentive application, financing model, intellectual-property arrangements and cross-border tax position. Incentive eligibility needs to be established before machinery orders, land commitments or construction decisions create irreversible costs.

Industrial and energy projects also require early engagement with ministries, regulators, municipalities, organized industrial zones and grid operators. Government relations in this context means maintaining a documented regulatory process, clarifying implementation obligations and ensuring that approvals, incentive milestones and import permissions remain aligned.

For exporters, import-export facilitation should cover tariff classification, rules of origin, customs valuation, product certification and carbon documentation. Companies seeking partners or customers may also need structured expo representation and sector-specific business development rather than general introductions.

Finally, large projects require continuous on-the-ground project management. Site acquisition, permitting, contractor selection, recruitment, supplier qualification and compliance reporting must be integrated into a single timetable. Türkiye and China have identified a credible field for deeper cooperation, but the transition from forum commitments to productive FDI will depend on whether investors can convert policy support into compliant, financed and operational businesses.