Türkiye has made a direct appeal for more Chinese capital in electric vehicles, batteries, renewable energy and advanced manufacturing, seeking to convert a heavily imbalanced trading relationship into a deeper industrial partnership. The message, delivered at the Türkiye-China Green Development Business Forum in Istanbul on November 9, matters beyond bilateral diplomacy. It places Chinese technology and financing at the center of Türkiye’s effort to expand clean-energy capacity, reduce its import bill and position itself as a manufacturing bridge between Asia and Europe.
Ankara Seeks Investment, Not Just Imports
“We welcome Chinese companies increasing their investments in Türkiye,” Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz told the forum, which was attended by Chinese Vice President Han Zheng and nearly 300 government and business representatives.
Yılmaz identified renewable energy, energy storage, electric vehicles, battery technologies, smart manufacturing, environmental technologies and sustainable infrastructure as priority sectors. Industry and Technology Minister Mehmet Fatih Kacır added solar cells, wind turbines, bioeconomy technologies, industrial robots and semiconductors to the prospective investment agenda.
The gathering, organized by Türkiye’s Foreign Economic Relations Board and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, took place as the countries marked 55 years of diplomatic relations. Chinese state reporting said Han called for greater coordination between the two countries’ green-development strategies, deeper technology cooperation and more localized production in Türkiye.
That emphasis on localization is significant. China is already Türkiye’s largest source of merchandise imports, but it remains a much smaller direct investor than European economies. Türkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs says bilateral trade reached $52.9 billion in 2025. Turkish imports from China totaled $49.6 billion, while exports were only $3.3 billion, producing a deficit of approximately $46.3 billion.
The product mix compounds the imbalance. Türkiye primarily exports minerals and basic materials to China, including marble, chromium, copper, lead, zinc and borates. Imports are dominated by higher-value products such as telecommunications equipment, computers, machinery, compressors and converters.
Ankara’s objective is therefore not simply to increase the volume of trade. It wants Chinese companies to manufacture more of what Türkiye currently imports, develop local suppliers and use Turkish facilities to serve surrounding markets. Yılmaz described the deficit as a structural issue requiring joint action, rather than a political dispute.
Green Technology Meets Türkiye’s Energy Requirements
Türkiye’s demand for green technology is supported by a rapidly expanding electricity system. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources reported that national installed capacity reached 127.4 gigawatts by the end of September 2026. Solar accounted for 22.2 percent of capacity and wind for 12.2 percent.
The expansion is substantial, but generation remains carbon-intensive. Ministry data show that coal supplied 33.3 percent of Türkiye’s electricity in 2025, compared with 11.9 percent from solar and 10.8 percent from wind. Electricity consumption reached 364.8 terawatt-hours that year and is projected under the National Energy Plan to rise to 510.5 terawatt-hours by 2035.
Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said ahead of COP31 that Türkiye’s broader energy transition could require about $500 billion of investment over 13 years, according to the Associated Press. Around $210 billion would come from Turkish public-sector companies, leaving considerable room for international capital.
Kacır told the Istanbul forum that Türkiye aims to increase combined solar and wind capacity from approximately 43 gigawatts to 175 gigawatts by 2040, alongside 140 gigawatt-hours of storage and 10 gigawatts of nuclear generation. The nearer-term policy benchmark remains 120 gigawatts of combined wind and solar capacity by 2035.
Chinese manufacturers are well placed to supply that expansion. China has developed extensive production capacity across photovoltaic wafers and cells, inverters, turbines, electric vehicles and lithium-ion batteries. Han said China’s mature renewable-energy supply chains were highly compatible with Türkiye’s transition needs and explicitly encouraged localized manufacturing.
Yet additional generating equipment alone will not resolve Türkiye’s energy constraints. Variable renewable power also requires new transmission infrastructure, grid balancing, storage and predictable connection rights. Developers must evaluate Energy Market Regulatory Authority licensing, grid capacity, land status, environmental assessments and procurement mechanisms before treating national capacity targets as bankable demand.
This makes project management and government relations central to actual deployment. A factory producing batteries or solar components must be coordinated with industrial-zone authorities, municipalities, utilities, environmental regulators and national ministries. For power projects, technical feasibility and grid access can be as consequential as the headline incentive package.
Incentives Create an Industrial Policy Platform
Türkiye’s main financial proposition is the HIT-30 high-technology investment program, announced with up to $30 billion of support through 2030. Its priority areas include new-energy vehicles, mobility batteries, stationary storage, battery components, wind systems, solar cells, wafers and ingots, green hydrogen, electrolyzers, industrial robots and semiconductors.
The program operates through Türkiye’s project-based incentive system. Under the Ministry of Industry and Technology’s rules, eligible HIT-30 projects generally require at least TRY 2 billion in fixed investment. Available instruments can include cash support, customs-duty and value-added-tax exemptions, corporate-tax reductions, land allocation, qualified-personnel support, energy assistance and financing-cost support.
Specific packages announced in connection with HIT-30 have included $5 billion for electric-vehicle investment and $4.5 billion for battery production. The solar program has targeted investments beginning at the ingot and cell stages, rather than only final panel assembly. This reflects Ankara’s effort to capture more of the value chain and reduce dependence on imported intermediate goods.
For investors, however, incentive eligibility is not automatic. Project scope, technology level, capacity, financing, domestic value creation, employment and implementation schedules must be documented and negotiated. An investment may also fall under technology, strategic, regional, free-zone or research and development incentives, each carrying different conditions and tax consequences.
Selecting the correct framework is therefore an early market-entry decision. Incorporation and corporate structuring influence whether a Turkish subsidiary, joint venture or another operating model can obtain land, employ personnel, import equipment, access financing and claim tax support. Legal and tax compliance must then continue throughout construction and operation, particularly where incentives are tied to milestones or performance commitments.
Türkiye’s Investment and Finance Office says 432 incentive certificates were issued to international investors in 2025, representing TRY 109.5 billion of investment and an expected 16,700 jobs. The broader FDI environment also improved: Central Bank data showed Türkiye attracted $13.1 billion in foreign direct investment in 2025, 12.2 percent more than in 2024. Manufacturing received $3.02 billion, or 31 percent of total inflows.
Automotive Projects Show Both the Potential and the Risk
Chinese automotive investment offers the clearest test of Türkiye’s localization strategy. BYD signed an agreement in 2024 for a $1 billion manufacturing complex in Manisa, with planned annual capacity of 150,000 vehicles and an associated research and development center.
In March 2025, Turkish authorities also announced a planned investment of up to $1 billion in Samsun by partners of Chery. Reuters reported that the project was designed to manufacture electric and hybrid vehicles and components, with proposed capacity of 200,000 vehicles annually.
These projects illustrate Türkiye’s appeal. It has an established automotive supplier base, experienced industrial labor, large domestic vehicle demand and logistical access to European, Middle Eastern, North African and Central Asian markets. Its customs union with the European Union facilitates trade in industrial goods that are in free circulation, although origin, product compliance and trade-defense rules still require careful analysis.
They also illustrate execution risk. In June 2026, Anadolu Agency reported that the Industry and Technology Ministry had suspended BYD’s access to incentives because planned progress had not been achieved. The ministry said the underlying agreement, company obligations and state guarantees remained valid, adding that incentives could be recovered if commitments were not fulfilled.
The episode is an important signal for prospective investors. Turkish incentives are contractual policy tools, not unconditional subsidies. Land allocation, construction deadlines, production capacity, employment and technology commitments can carry enforceable consequences.
It also shows why announcements must be distinguished from capital expenditure already underway. Site control, zoning, environmental approvals, construction contracts, equipment imports and supplier qualification all affect delivery. On-the-ground project management becomes especially important when the parent company, contractors and public authorities operate across different languages, legal systems and decision-making structures.
From Trade Corridor to Production Base
Türkiye’s proposition extends beyond its domestic market. Ankara wants to align the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, using railways, ports and logistics infrastructure to strengthen east-west supply chains. The countries established a joint working mechanism on that alignment in Beijing in November 2024.
Chinese companies entering Türkiye must nevertheless test the regional-hub thesis at product level. The EU-Türkiye customs union covers most industrial goods, but it does not automatically convert minimal assembly into Turkish origin. The European Commission notes that origin rules determine a product’s economic nationality and are used in applying anti-dumping, countervailing and other trade-policy measures.
For vehicles, batteries, solar products and other politically sensitive technologies, investors need a detailed model covering tariff classification, origin, local content, customs procedures, technical standards and carbon exposure. Türkiye’s 2025 Climate Law created the legal basis for a domestic emissions trading system, while the government’s medium-term program calls for alignment with the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.
Import-export facilitation must consequently be integrated into factory design. Decisions about which components to localize, which to import from China and where to perform substantial processing will affect duties, working capital and export-market access. Supplier development is not merely a political concession. It may be necessary to establish a resilient and commercially defensible operating model.
What This Means for Foreign Investors
The Istanbul forum has strengthened the political mandate for Chinese green-technology investment, but the next phase will be determined by executable projects. Türkiye offers genuine demand, significant incentive capacity, industrial infrastructure and proximity to major markets. It also presents a multilayered regulatory environment in which incentives, customs rules, energy licensing, environmental compliance and local implementation are closely connected.
A prospective investor should begin with a market-entry assessment that tests Turkish and regional demand, competing capacity, grid or infrastructure constraints, supplier availability and export economics. That analysis should be followed by an incorporation and corporate-structuring plan suited to incentive applications, land acquisition, financing, taxation and repatriation.
Investment-incentive work must identify the appropriate HIT-30 or alternative support framework and translate the project into measurable commitments. Legal and tax compliance should cover permits, employment, transfer pricing, customs, environmental obligations and emerging carbon rules. Government relations and regulatory liaison are particularly relevant where ministries, industrial zones, energy authorities and municipalities share responsibility.
Expo and trade-fair representation can help international manufacturers identify distributors, suppliers and potential joint-venture partners before committing fixed capital. Import-export planning must establish origin, certification and logistics pathways, while project management is required to carry the investment from site selection through construction, equipment installation and production.
Türkiye’s invitation to Chinese companies is clear. The investable opportunity lies in determining which projects can move beyond equipment sales and diplomatic commitments to create compliant, locally integrated and export-capable businesses.